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MR. KEYTE:  Good morning.  Welcome to the 
second day of the Fordham Conference, the third day 
for those who participated in the Economics Workshop. 
We had a long but I think very productive 
and interesting day yesterday.  A few years ago we 
decided that Friday will not be a long day, and so we 
will continue with our kind of long half-day for our 
panels and presentations. 
Today Deb Feinstein of Arnold & Porter will 
lead a panel on merger enforcement around the globe 
with leading enforcers and practitioners.  It should 
be quite interesting. 
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While there is a fair amount of convergence 
in the merger area, as has been discussed earlier 
yesterday, things are still moving.  There’s a lot of 
interest obviously in vertical mergers.  There’s 
minute interest in what at least I used to call 
conglomerate mergers.  Even portfolio effects − God 
forbid — may come back.  That should be quite 
interesting. 
Then Sharis Posen of General Electric is 
going to lead our in-house counsel roundtable.  This 
year we thought we’d do something different.  We’re 
always looking to do something a little different.  
We’ll have two enforcers and two general counsels as 
well as Sharis have a dialogue about 
multijurisdictional investigations.  I’m not looking 
for fisticuffs, but I think this should be quite 
interesting. 
As you saw from the program, at the end of 
the day Bill Kovacic has graciously agreed to close us 
out with his observations.  I think it’s just great.  
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I will always take Bill over myself for some closing 
observations about the state of antitrust in the 
world. 
First we’ll start with our two keynote 
speakers.   
Andrea Coscelli, Chief Executive of the 
Competition and Markets Authority, also has a Stanford 
PhD in Economics in the pocket, which brings a much 
different and interesting perspective to enforcement 
and policy.  I think we all really want to know what 
is going in the United Kingdom.  We always hear about 
the United States, we hear about the European Union.  
Where does the United Kingdom fit in?  What are their 
priorities?  How are they dealing with Brexit as it 
unfolds?  So we look forward to that. 
Then Maureen Ohlhausen, who we heard a 
little bit from at lunch, will give us her perspective 
on the state of play of antitrust in an environment in 
which the consumer welfare standard itself is being 
questioned and has significant implications for how 
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enforcement decisions are made.  As her time period 
winds down, and she will eventually be on the Court of 
Claims, she will give us her perspective on U.S. 
enforcement and antitrust globally. 
And then, of course, we will have again — 
and I want you to be more proactive — a question-and-
answer session for twenty or thirty minutes.  Please 
think about some questions.  This is the time that you 
often don’t get, frankly, at other conferences.  So 
let’s take advantage of that. 
Andrea? 
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Andrea Coscelli 
Chief Executive of the Competition and Markets Authority 
 
MR. COSCELLI:  Thank you, James, and thanks 
for inviting me.  It has been a very interesting 
couple of days. 
I have prepared some remarks which are 
slightly more for a general audience, so what I 
thought I would do today here is just focus on some 
highlights and then also try to weave in some points 
from the discussions over the last couple of days. 
The main thing I want to talk about — I was 
trying to represent a bit the situation in the United 
Kingdom, and obviously there are significant overlaps 
in the debate with what’s happening here and what’s 
happening around Europe.  Obviously, there are 
significant differences from an institutional point of 
view, history, things we have discussed over the last 
couple of days, but I think there are very significant 
similarities as well. 
The first point I want to make is if we go 
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back to first principles — again, as James referred, I 
am an economist, so in many ways I was trained to 
think about the materiality of impacts.  I have now 
been working in antitrust and regulation for the last 
twenty-five years.   
If I try to distill the key learnings in my 
mind, I think at the end of the day what we are trying 
to do here is to try to create an environment that 
fosters dynamic competition in a sustainable way. 
We know that there is the very robust 
finding that in the medium to long term if we have 
sustainable dynamic competition where there are enough 
businesses competing that are allowed to experiment 
with new business models, innovate and launch new 
products and services, we know this works.  So how do 
you get there?   
Obviously, a core component of it is what 
[FTC] Commissioner Chopra last night was referring to, 
a sort of case-by-case adjudication — what in the UK 
we refer to as competition enforcement or consumer 
 7 
 
 
 
 
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.      714-960-4577 
enforcement — the decisions in cases, which is 
obviously most of what we do. 
But the other part of it I think is what in 
the United States you call rule-making, which I call 
regulatory oversight, so any forms of regulation or 
legislation which create the rules of the game. 
When I think about what we try to do with 
the sort of expertise that we have at the CMA, we are 
doing a bit of both.  Now, we do some rule-making 
directly ourselves, but that is probably a small part 
of it.  But we do spend quite a bit of time as an 
expert adviser to others, to make sure that when rules 
are imposed or updated there is a very strong learning 
from competition coming in. 
If I look at our interventions over the last 
five to ten years, obviously very often we are the 
party that comes to the discussions with a strong 
deregulatory focus.  I think that is clearly in the 
DNA of competition authorities and it’s very important 
and it’s the right answer in many markets. 
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But I have increasingly become a bit more 
agnostic about it.  I think there are other markets 
where we can achieve a much better result by updating 
regulations or introducing new regulations.  At the 
end of the day, every single market of importance has 
some regulation of some sort.  So, the question is 
what kind of regulation is there, as opposed to a 
binary discussion between competition and regulation. 
If I look at some of the discussions we are 
having with the wider community, if I think about 
discussions in Parliament or the wider debate in the 
United Kingdom, I find myself often going back to 
examples where we know that the vast majority of 
people believe that competition has delivered. 
If we go back to things like aviation in 
Europe or telecommunications, over the last twenty or 
twenty-five years these sectors have delivered for 
consumers.  Pretty much every consumer immediately and 
instinctively gets the point:  prices are lower, there 
is more capacity, quality is higher.  This has been 
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achieved through a combination of essentially 
procompetitive regulation, privatizations in the case 
of Europe, liberalization, and competition 
enforcement. 
Obviously, the regulated sectors are an 
important part of the economy, an important part of I 
would say the ecosystem in terms of outcomes, because 
it really matters for consumers, almost by definition, 
and trying to get good outcomes there is very 
important.  So, in the United Kingdom we spend quite a 
lot of time working together with the sector 
regulators to try to make sure that there is the right 
mix of rule-making and enforcement in the specific 
sectors to achieve that.  
In the United Kingdom the key regulators 
have had a very significant infusion of competition 
thinking over the last fifteen to twenty years.  I 
spent part of my career in the telecoms and media 
regulator Ofcom, which has a very strong competitive 
bent in the way regulation is applied.  A lot of the 
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rule-making there is about creating the conditions for 
competition. 
If you think about interventions in mobile, 
like some occasional caps for spectrum auctions or 
agreements among particular operators to share costs 
to increase investment, these were procompetitive 
rule-making interventions.  I think in terms of 
materiality and the positive impact, these have been 
very significant, very positive interventions. 
The focus has always been to create a 
sustainable level playing field.  In the UK mobile 
market there are four players, and the regulator and 
ourselves strongly believe that this is the right 
number and that this is working well for the UK 
market. 
There was an attempt [in this market] to 
merge to three players a couple of years ago, and our 
friend Carles [Esteva Mosso] and some of the people 
here helped us block that particular merger, which 
again we think was the right decision.  Interestingly, 
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in relation to some of the recent four-to-three mobile 
mergers in Europe, we now have institutions like the 
OECD and others saying that was a mistake and 
something should be done to fix that particular 
problem [for instance in the German market]. 
If I look at the financial services sector, 
again a sector where in the United Kingdom there is a 
very strong competitive focus, when the fintech 
companies started expanding in London over the last 
two to three years, the regulator took a very 
procompetitive approach and proactively engaged with 
the fintech companies to try to change the rules to 
make sure that they created a level playing field 
between the incumbent operators and the new players.  
Again, in terms of creating sustainable, dynamic 
competition, I thought that was a very positive 
intervention. 
When I look at what we do, we do a number of 
things.  I have three examples here that I think 
highlight some of the things I have been saying. 
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The first example is heat networks, which 
are essentially this ecofriendly-form of heating that 
we believe in the United Kingdom is going to be a key 
component for decarbonization over the next fifteen 
years.  This is a sector that grew very quickly with 
very limited regulation.   
So, when we started looking into it we found 
a number of problems.  What we concluded in our recent 
study was that there should be the same level of 
regulatory oversight in this sector as there is in 
traditional energy and gas networks and that the 
sector regulator should acquire the powers to regulate 
this sector.  So again, from our point of view this is 
a procompetitive intervention to ensure that this 
sector is sustainable and grows, but in the short term 
we think it requires more regulation. 
Secondary ticketing is a sector that has 
created many headaches for myself and my predecessors.  
There are a number of companies that have been very 
aggressive commercially in the UK market.  We have 
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been looking through our consumer protection lens at 
some of these commercial practices.  We recently 
announced that we are going to go to court to try to 
get interim orders to stop one of these companies, 
called Viagogo, from continuing to engage in some of 
their current commercial practices. 
Again, this is an area where we are not very 
happy with the outcomes.  We are working through our 
enforcement powers.  If we don’t succeed through our 
enforcement powers, personally, I am quite relaxed 
about potentially the government introducing some form 
of legislation or regulation for the sector because at 
the end of the day if after a number of years the 
outcomes don’t improve, I think it is our 
responsibility to make sure that things change. 
The final example is an area that most of 
the people in this room have engaged with over the 
last two or three years, which is the disruption 
brought by a number of app-based taxi services.  
Obviously, we have had various rounds of discussions 
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in the United Kingdom, like in other countries. 
But what I want to say is that in the last 
few months the government decided to set up a working 
group with us, the regulator, government itself, and 
some of the key commercial players to essentially 
update the rules, the licensing conditions, in a more 
procompetitive way while keeping some of the basic 
safeguards that are very important for passengers.  I 
personally think this is the right approach. 
Technology has moved on.  Clearly there is 
dynamic competition.  Clearly the existing licensing 
conditions were not appropriate to create a level 
playing field.  I think this is the best way to update 
them while taking into account the various concerns. 
If I look at the debate in the United 
Kingdom, which as you know is a country that has 
always had a very strong focus on competition and 
growth and innovation, almost every day there is an 
article in the media about the lack of a level playing 
field in a number of these sectors.  
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There was an article yesterday about Amazon 
and bricks-and-mortar bookshops.  There have been 
articles about Starbucks and coffee companies.  There 
have been various discussions about Airbnb.   
I think the common denominator in the 
discussion is really the point about the perceived 
lack of a level playing field.  I think if most people 
perceived the presence of a level playing field 
between these various companies, consumers would not 
worry as some of these sectors (such as cafes) are 
quite competitive The key concern is whether there is 
a level playing field today. 
That is obviously a very complicated 
question.  There are lots of issues about employment 
legislation, about taxation, things that we as 
competition authorities are not particularly focused 
on for very good reasons. 
But at the same time whenever we are 
involved and whenever we are asked, I think it is very 
important that we bring this focus on the level 
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playing field to the discussions and try to help with 
our expertise move things along. 
In terms of what we are doing directly, I 
just want to refer to a few things quickly. 
We are spending obviously a lot of time on 
digital markets, like a number of our fellow agencies.  
We are focusing increasingly on vulnerable consumers 
in the United Kingdom.  That is either vulnerability 
per se or vulnerability in particular situations.  For 
instance, we are doing some work at the moment on the 
funerals market.  We did some work recently on 
residential care homes. 
We also like to use our tools flexibly, 
again as many agencies do.  So when we do our merger 
control work sometimes we pick up concerns about 
competitive practices and we open sometimes 
Competition Act cases on the back of it. 
We did last year a market inquiry into 
price-comparison websites, what we call digital 
comparison tools, and we got some direct enforcement 
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cases coming out of it, both on consumer protection 
and on competition grounds. 
You know the UK Government has recently 
published a document on consumer protection, a 
Consumer Green Paper, trying to think about changing 
some of the legislation, and we are actively involved 
in that debate, trying to bring our expertise to that. 
At the same time, and again in common — 
Bruce Kobayashi was talking a couple of days ago about 
merger retrospectives at the FTC — we are also very 
interested in the current debate about merger 
enforcement, whether we are exactly in the right place 
or whether things need to change.  So we are quite 
active in that.  I just have a couple of examples here 
just to suggest some of the things we are doing at the 
moment. 
Obviously, there is a debate about 
acquisitions by digital platforms, whether authorities 
have been too lenient over the last ten years or so.  
I recently went back and I read our decision on 
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Facebook/Instagram in 2012.  Obviously, we are now 
looking at it with the benefit of hindsight, but it 
does look a bit naïve.  And certainly with hindsight 
you think the level of knowledge within the agency at 
the time compared to the level of knowledge that 
probably a core group of executives at Facebook had 
about the opportunities potentially coming out of the 
acquisition, when you read our decision you think 
probably there was a gap there.  There will always be 
a gap.  The question is whether you can reduce the gap 
somehow, if you can try to bridge it, by increasing 
our knowledge in-house, by learning from past 
decisions. 
Obviously, on Facebook/Instagram we will 
never know what the alternative would have been.  In a 
sense, we will never know for certain what the 
counterfactual is.  Clearly, Instagram today is what 
it is because of the ownership by Facebook and the 
combination of assets.  We will never know what the 
independent path would have been. 
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Another case I just want to briefly mention 
is a decision we took last year on a merger of two 
platforms in the United Kingdom, two food delivery 
platforms called Just Eat and Hungryhouse.  It was an 
interesting decision because there was a judgment to 
be made about essentially a merger that from a static 
point of view looked pretty problematic.  The platform 
Just Eat got up to around 80 percent of the market 
after the acquisition.  We cleared it on the back of 
an entry-and-expansion story by rival platforms, 
particularly Uber Eats and a large player in Europe 
called Deliveroo. 
Interestingly, the day after we announced 
the clearance the share price of Just Eat went up by 
10 percent, which indicated that the market didn’t 
quite believe our judgment on entry and expansion.  
Since then some of this entry and expansion has 
materialized and the share price has corrected. 
The reason I am referring to this case is 
because I think it is important that we do some kind 
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of formal monitoring on some of these cases.  This is 
a reasonably easy case to monitor because a number of 
the key players are listed companies.  I am also keen 
that internally we use information from the public 
markets to do a little bit of tracking of some of our 
decisions to continuously inform ourselves. 
As I said, we are doing quite a lot of work 
in digital markets, quite a lot through the consumer 
protection lens.  Again, I think that is unsurprising.  
A number of these markets have a fairly large number 
of players so the concern is unlikely to be about 
concentration.  But these markets have expanded very 
quickly and I think it is quite important for us to do 
a degree of policing of the markets to make sure 
consumers receive the protections they are entitled 
to. 
We are currently looking at hotel online 
booking.  We have spent quite a lot of time on online 
gambling jointly with the sector regulator.  We 
finished recently work on online dating and cloud 
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storage. 
Hotel online booking again is, I think, an 
example of what I am talking about, in the sense that 
this sector has been under quite a lot of scrutiny by 
ourselves and a number of the other agencies here for 
a number of years through different lenses.   
If we go back four or five years, there were 
a number of competition enforcement cases around 
Europe mainly focusing on some of these restrictive 
clauses, wide MFN clauses and in some cases the narrow 
MFN clauses between the platforms and the hotels.  
There were commitments offered in Europe by these 
companies.  A number of national parliaments decided 
to go further in Europe and essentially ban all of 
these MFN clauses. 
We recently went back looking into it on the 
back of various complaints we had received using a 
consumer protection angle, and the case is ongoing.  
Interestingly again, linking it back to merger 
retrospectives, [hotel online booking] is a sector 
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that, differently from the other digital markets I 
referred to, is heavily concentrated and there is a 
history of acquisitions here as well.  So, again, it 
is probably quite interesting to go back and look at 
this history of acquisitions and again think whether 
with hindsight these clearances were always the right 
decisions. 
Just to finish off, a couple of points. 
One point is, as I said, we are very keen to 
be an expert adviser to government and to regulators.  
I think we are a center of expertise.  We have 
resources.  We spend quite a lot of time looking at 
specific markets and markets in general.  I think we 
can achieve significant results by helping others when 
they work through policymaking in specific areas.  So 
this is an area I am personally spending quite a lot 
of my time on. 
The final point, again which is very much 
relevant to this conference, is when I look across our 
portfolio the international connections are clearly 
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extremely strong.  The CMA has always been a 
significant player in the international context. 
As you know, we are in the midst of Brexit.  
We don’t know exactly the form that Brexit will take, 
but I think under many assumptions we will end up 
doing a lot of parallel work with our international 
colleagues.  We certainly are very keen to continue to 
invest a lot of our time and efforts in joint work 
with others. 
Those are the key points I wanted to make 
today.  I am very happy to take any questions later on 
after Maureen’s speech. 
Thank you very much. 
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Maureen Ohlhausen 
Commissioner, U.S. Federal Trade Commission 
 
MS. OHLHAUSEN:  Thank you, Andrea, for 
getting us off to such a good start this morning and 
so many interesting topics. 
I’m delighted to be here.  It’s nice to be 
back again.  I attended the Fordham Conference on 
several occasions, and this event is always one of the 
highlights of the calendar.  So as my time at the FTC 
draws short, I think it is perhaps particularly 
appropriate that one of my last public appearances as 
a Commissioner will be here at Fordham. 
James, you talked about the in-house counsel 
panel that’s coming up later this afternoon.  I was 
very pleased to see that my cousin, John Blood, the GC 
of Anheuser-Busch, is going to be on the panel.  John 
and I grew up around the corner from each other and, 
with all the cousins and a big gang of neighborhood 
kids, we always had sports teams, whatever the sport 
was in season, when we were playing in the street.  So 
 25 
 
 
 
 
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.      714-960-4577 
it’s nice to know, I think, that the Cedar Sluggers 
had a particularly good lineup and we continue to play 
in the big leagues together. 
As many of you know, I am rounding out what 
has been six incredible years as a Commissioner at the 
Federal Trade Commission.  I have had the honor of 
serving across two presidential administrations, three 
different Congresses, and with ten other 
Commissioners.  
My service has been very rewarding because 
through the FTC’s truly bipartisan efforts we have 
advanced the knowledge and the tools needed to protect 
consumers and promote competition in our free-market 
economy. 
Although I will focus most of my remarks on 
recent enforcement today.  Since I’m in a position 
where it’s a little hard for me to forecast the 
future, I’m going to be a little bit backward-looking 
necessarily. 
But my work at the FTC has encompassed so 
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much more than just enforcement.  For example, as the 
Acting Chairman, I led an initiative to promote 
Economic Liberty, which has helped to spotlight 
unnecessary or overbroad occupational licensing, which 
often disproportionately harms those near the bottom 
of the economic ladder and burdens people who have to 
move a lot, like military families, in the United 
States. 
It was very interesting that during the 
discussion yesterday Fred Jenny was talking about what 
are things causing problems with labor mobility.  I 
think in the United States you can look to things like 
occupational licensing, where back in the 1950s only 
about 5 percent of jobs needed an occupational license 
at the state level and now it’s close to 25 or 30 
percent.  So I think there are a lot of different 
factors we need to look at as we look with some of 
these bigger trends that are affecting antitrust even 
if they’re not caused by antitrust. 
Excessive occupational licensing in the 
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United States does remain a big problem, but our 
efforts are starting to pay off.  Already a number of 
states have made some early moves towards reform.  The 
Secretary of Labor, Alex Acosta, got very interested 
in this issue.  I’ve talked to him about it.  While 
there’s much more to do in this space, these early 
signs are encouraging, with state legislators and 
thought leaders increasingly interested in the issues. 
The problems we sought to highlight with the 
Economic Liberty Task Force don’t end at our borders.  
It’s not just a U.S. issue.  This domestic initiative 
has already drawn interest from some overseas 
enforcers who similarly recognize the potential 
harmful effects of excessive and unnecessary 
occupational licensing on their citizens. 
Speaking of international engagement, we 
have also been continually engaged with our 
counterparts overseas through both direct and 
bilateral meetings with individual enforcers and 
through the International Competition Network and the 
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OECD.   
On all of these fronts we’ve continued to 
press for greater convergence and transparency in due 
process around the globe.  Makan Delrahim talked a 
little bit about some of these efforts yesterday. 
In early 2017 the U.S. agencies issued Joint 
Guidelines for International Enforcement and 
Cooperation, an effort that I was closely involved 
with, and I certainly commend those Guidelines to all 
of you.  I think they have some very important updates 
but also kept a lot of things the same. 
As global trade has spawned more and more 
global markets, we’ve been focused on the 
extraterritorial reach of competition enforcement and 
providing the necessary protection to intellectual 
property that is needed to spur future innovation. 
By necessity, the great bulk of the FTC’s 
international work is quiet and it generates few 
headlines in the press.  But that doesn’t make it any 
less important.   
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The process of building a baseline of common 
legal and procedural norms around the world is never 
going to be easy, and there are always going to be 
setbacks and challenges along the way.  But with that 
said, I am ultimately an optimist about our ability to 
move these issues forward over the long term.  I’m 
heartened to see how countries with little or no 
history of competition enforcement, or even market-
based economies, are increasingly coming to recognize 
the importance of sensible competition enforcement, 
and I’m very proud of the efforts we made under my 
watch to continue, and hopefully even strengthen, the 
positive and constructive working relationship the FTC 
has enjoyed with many of our counterparts overseas.  
It has been so nice to be at Fordham and see many of 
you in person again. 
Finally, before we start talking about 
specific cases, I want to take a minute to address how 
the FTC functioned during a very unusual period, when 
as the Acting Chairman I ran the agency with just one 
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fellow Commissioner for almost a year and a half.  Not 
to belabor the obvious, but when there are only two 
Commissioners and one of them is a Republican and one 
of them is a Democrat, no case goes forward unless 
there is bipartisan consensus. 
Now, some Washington pundits and members of 
the bar assumed that the composition of the Commission 
during my tenure was a recipe for inaction, and 
occasional stories reflected such assumptions without  
necessarily examining the underlying facts.  
How, honestly, I didn’t have a lot of time 
to read such stories because I was occupied bringing 
cases and coming up with creative ways to deploy a 
ready, busy staff and stretch a tight budget to pay 
for expert testimony in all the big cases we were 
pursuing. 
Here are some of the facts about that. 
During my time as the Acting Chairman, the 
FTC identified a total of thirty-two proposed mergers 
with significant competition concerns.  Of these the 
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agency accepted a consent agreement to protect 
consumers in nineteen cases, with the balance of these 
deals either abandoned in the face of our challenge or 
contested in litigation.   
That made for a very full litigation docket.  
At one point we had ten competition matters in active 
litigation at the same time with three more on appeal, 
which approaches historic levels.  Several of these 
contested matters are still pending. 
We also brought and won a litigate 
challenged to the Wilhelm Wilhelmsen/Drew Marine 
merger, which I’ll discuss in more detail shortly. 
In addition, Walgreens substantially 
restructured its proposed acquisition of Rite-Aid due 
to Commission concerns. 
And the work we did during my tenure 
continues to pay dividends.  Earlier this week we won 
a PI challenge to Tronox’s acquisition of Cristal.  
That was a merger challenged last fall. 
And the action didn’t stop at merger review.  
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We also brought forward nine different conduct cases, 
including several challenging anticompetitive behavior 
by drug manufacturers.  I was very pleased that I did 
inherit a nice full pipeline from the previous 
administration and I think we were able to capitalize 
on that. 
Overall these numbers actually reflect a 
slight uptick in the case of enforcement from what 
prevailed during the previous administration.  This is 
just life, and I don’t mean to overplay that, but it 
certainly didn’t show any decline. 
So far from being hamstrung by having two 
Commissioners who needed to cooperate, our 
impressively bipartisan record managed to keep the 
Bureau of Competition quite busy. 
But we also got some help from the well-
developed state of the law.  Today the caselaw in the 
United States generally reflects the contours of a 
broad bipartisan consensus that antitrust should be 
used to protect consumers and that our enforcement 
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work should be well grounded in modern economic 
analysis. 
Now, despite some criticism at the margins — 
and we’ve heard some of that in the Conference — that 
consensus remains alive and well and it continues to 
govern much of the routine decision-making within the 
agency. 
The principal drivers of that consensus are 
unlikely to change anytime soon.  For example, we know 
that mergers creating durable market power do not 
serve consumers well.  Thus, it really should not be 
much of a surprise that the pace of merger enforcement 
at the FTC in recent decades probably varies more on 
the basis of overall economic activity than on who won 
the last election. 
Consistency in enforcement improves the 
predictability of government action, allowing all of 
you in the private bar to counsel your clients more 
effectively, while also ensuring that enforcement does 
not chill procompetitive business activity 
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unnecessarily.  This is all for the best, and frankly 
it should not be a great surprise to anyone when the 
FTC stands up in court to challenge a problematic 
acquisition. 
On the other hand, when antitrust 
enforcement becomes more of a political exercise 
instead of a dispassionate and apolitical law 
enforcement matter, predictability is lost and the 
actions of government can appear arbitrary. 
In turn, injecting politics into antitrust 
enforcement undermines public trust and confidence in 
the entire exercise.  Now a frequent topic of 
discussion among competition enforcers around the 
world is the importance of stripping away political 
preferences from what is, and ought to be, a fairly 
predictable and routine exercise of government’s law 
enforcement authority.  I’m very proud of the fact 
that during my tenure leading the FTC the agency 
practiced what it preached in that regard. 
Now I’d like to address some of the specific 
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cases. 
In Wilhelmsen/Drew we challenged the merger 
of the two largest suppliers of certain specialty 
chemicals to the marine industry.  Our investigation 
ultimately showed that although the chemicals sold by 
the parties were widely available, fleet customers 
traveling all over the world needed consistent access 
to a precise formulation at virtually every port where 
their vessels docked as changing chemical suppliers 
from port to port is highly problematic and 
inefficient for customers. 
We also learned that the parties had the 
only viable global networks of supply points around 
the world that could meet this critical need for so-
called global fleet customers.  As we showed in court, 
this is how both the parties’ own executives and their 
customers saw the market.  And we also demonstrated 
that price discrimination against these global fleet 
customers was possible, leading to a high risk of 
anticompetitive effects. 
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Proper antitrust analysis requires a careful 
evaluation of actual conditions in every market we 
investigate and sophisticated economic analysis.  This 
case principally stands for the importance of that 
kind of careful deep dive.  This is very much a case 
where the once-over-lightly answer and the deep dive 
yielded markedly different conclusions.  The parties 
eventually abandoned the transaction after we 
successfully won a preliminary injunction in federal 
court. 
Another perhaps surprising case to some 
outsiders was our challenge to the proposed merger of 
Smucker and Conagra.  In Smucker/Conagra we opposed a 
merger between the Crisco and Wesson brands of cooking 
oils that would have given Smucker control of 70 
percent of the grocery market for branded canola and 
vegetable oil.  The parties eventually abandoned the 
transaction in the face of the FTC’s complaint. 
The entire case turned on just one issue: do 
the private-label house brands meaningfully compete 
 37 
 
 
 
 
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.      714-960-4577 
with the branded products in this market, or is their 
effect likely to be so de minimis that we should 
exclude them from the market?  If the private-label 
brands were in the market, there wasn’t much reason 
for concern; but if they were excluded, the 
transaction was very problematic. 
It turns out when you really look carefully 
at the question the narrower market definition is the 
correct one.  So when you’re making your grandmother’s 
recipe for the holidays and that faded, stained index 
card in your recipe box calls for Crisco, many people 
are just going to have a lot of interest in buying the 
cheaper house-brand alternative that might not work 
the same way.  Most consumers buy this product 
infrequently, and when they do they tend to be fairly 
risk-averse. 
We also had very good data here, and the 
empirical work all pointed towards the narrower market 
being the correct one.  So we followed where the facts 
and the economics led in this matter, even though they 
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ultimately brought us to what was a rather surprising 
conclusion. 
Now, I would caution all of you to be 
careful about generalizing from this example to other 
retail markets.  What I would say is that you should 
expect that once we inevitably figure out the right 
question to ask, we will put in the time and effort 
necessary to make sure that we get to the answer best 
supported by the facts sand economics.  We’re also not 
going to be dissuaded from a conclusion that is firmly 
supported by the weight of the record evidence even if 
it might seem contrary to many people’s initial 
assumption.  
Next I’ll talk briefly about CDK/Auto/Mate.  
This is a case where the FTC ultimately blocked a 
proposed tieup between the providers of specialized 
software used by automobile dealers.   
The fact pattern was essentially a large, 
established firm with a substantial share of the 
market buying a relatively small upstart that had 
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enjoyed some recent success and appeared poised to 
challenge the market leaders more aggressively.   
The market was concentrated and barriers to 
meaningful entry were substantial.  To be sure, there 
was some current competition between the firms, but 
the greatest concern we identified during the 
investigation was the likely future competition that 
would be lost should Auto/Mate be absorbed by CDK. 
Some have questioned whether the existing 
antitrust paradigm can ever reach this kind of 
behavior, where a big player squashes or absorbs a 
promising upstart before it can ultimately grow into a 
more substantial competitor.  I think our action shows 
that the Commission can and will take these issues 
seriously. 
I will also note that Auto/Mate had certain 
clear advantages, particularly reputational, that 
other smaller providers lacked and that it would have 
been exceedingly difficult to replicate rapidly.  This 
gave us greater confidence that the loss of 
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competition from Auto/Mate was unlikely to be replaced 
rapidly by another small firm.  I think that was an 
important part of the analysis here and likely to be 
an issue that will arise frequently in cases where 
there is substantial evidence that the current market 
share understates the likely competitive significance 
of the transaction. 
In the face of our challenge the parties 
ultimately abandoned the deal, and shortly thereafter 
Auto/Mate referenced the FTC’s action to protect 
competition prominently in its marketing materials 
while announcing that it was “Back to doing business 
differently than giants do.  And the big guys?  
They’re back to shaking in their boots.”  It’s not 
often we get such a quick and definitive affirmation 
of our analysis. 
Finally, I want to talk just briefly about a 
case we did not print.  When Amazon decided it wanted 
to buy Whole Foods we did not intervene.  At the time 
this was not a popular decision in some quarters and 
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we were criticized for not being sufficiently 
aggressive.  Now, I obviously can’t talk about the 
details of a case we decided not to bring.  However, I 
do want to talk about what happened since that 
transaction occurred. 
A year after the transaction Whole Foods 
continues to operate largely as it has previously 
while prices have either remained the same or fallen 
for many products at Whole Foods.  Consumers have more 
alternatives for purchasing Whole Foods’ products even 
in markets where there was no Whole Foods location 
previously.  And more importantly, we are seeing 
rivals adjusting to this new reality, beefing up their 
own home delivery offerings and investing in the 
modernization of their own supply chain to defend 
their existing positions from a new, nimble, and well-
heeled rival. 
Competition remains robust and in some ways 
seems to have become even more intense since this 
transaction.  In fact, the March 2018 issue of 
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Washingtonian magazine had a cover story calling this 
“The Golden Age of Grocery Shopping,” and I’ve put 
that one in my scrapbook. 
When you embrace competitive markets you 
also embrace change and the need for firms to 
constantly improve or risk being left behind.  These 
are all things that the antitrust laws exist to 
foster, not prohibit. 
In conclusion, it’s clear that the FTC 
pursued a robust enforcement agenda during my tenure 
as the Acting Chairman.  We executed what I believe 
was a sensible, balanced merger control program deeply 
anchored in modern economic theory, and we also 
brought conduct cases, tried to advance economic 
liberty, and engaged in lots of consumer protection 
enforcement. 
As I prepare to leave the FTC, I feel proud 
that I’ve passed on to its next set of leaders an 
agency in excellent shape.  It’s a bit tired out from 
litigating quite so much.  
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So this little agency, with its 
comparatively tiny budget, punches far above its 
weight on so many fronts, and has long done this.  
It’s a wonderful place to work, chockfull of very 
smart, hardworking, dedicated professionals many of 
whom could be making a lot more money elsewhere.  And 
U.S. consumers are lucky to have the FTC in their 
corner, just as I was lucky to have had the privilege 
of leading it. 
Thank you very much and I look forward to 
the discussion. 
MR. KEYTE:  Thank you, Maureen and Andrea, 
for extremely informative presentations that do 
highlight a lot of issues, especially in relation to 
what we had yesterday on the program, for example, 
Antitrust and Populism. 
I’ll start off with a question and hopefully 
we’ll get some more from the audience. 
There has been a lot of discussion about the 
objectives of antitrust enforcement and the consumer 
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welfare standard.  I think, Maureen, you’re pretty 
clear where you stand on the consumer welfare 
standard. 
So, Andrea, I want to ask you.  Do you have 
similar views?  Do you think there should be some 
flexibility, whether to broaden it and in what ways?  
Is that something that you’ve had to address or think 
about? 
MR. COSCELLI:  I think my position is I’m 
pretty comfortable with where we are.  There is an 
issue, obviously, about priorities in enforcement and 
burden of proof.  But there is clearly more debate 
around now than in the last twenty, twenty-five years 
about changes in legislation.  I would expect to be 
part of that debate in the United Kingdom, but it is 
ultimately for Parliament to decide whether to change 
anything. 
My personal view is I’m very much in the 
camp that I think we are in a pretty good place in 
terms of laws and it’s about enforcing.  But there are 
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more and more people who worry about the outcomes they 
observe. 
MR. KEYTE: My own follow-up to myself:  We 
hear — especially from Europe and from the United 
Kingdom, and we heard it from Johannes as well and we 
see it in the speeches — the phrase “leveling the 
playing field,” wanting to level the playing field. 
For practitioners and enforcers in the 
United States — or at least the caselaw in the United 
States is — that doesn’t really appear to be the 
objective because it has a tendency, at least in the 
U.S. law, to potentially protect competitors over 
competition. 
I want both of you to address — maybe 
starting with you, Andrea — what do you mean by 
“leveling the playing field,” and how does that fit in 
with concepts like “competition for the space,” the 
Schumpeter idea?  How does that fit in with making 
sure you’re protecting dynamic competition as opposed 
to competitors if you are trying to level the playing 
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field all the time? 
MR. COSCELLI:  It’s definitely not about 
protecting competitors per se.  I think it’s pretty 
clear to me and to I think most of the commentators 
that it’s not about particular companies or particular 
business models. 
I think the discussion is in many ways 
linked to the regulation.  I think there are two types 
of problems in the debate.  One is the traditional one 
that we are all very familiar with, which is when new 
business models emerge often the existing rules and 
regulations are not appropriate for the business 
models or can be used strategically by the incumbents 
to frustrate entry.  That is, I would say, something 
that through advocacy competition authorities have 
been very good over the years at dealing with. 
The other angle, which I think is a slightly 
more recent angle which is coming to us from a number 
of commentators, is that sometimes the new disrupters 
are taking advantage of some regulatory loopholes, 
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which when you go through them and you think about it, 
you think maybe something should be done about that as 
well.  I think that in my mind is what people refer to 
as a level the playing field. 
Without going into international taxation, 
which we all know is a very complex topic, and it’s 
not really for competition authorities, there is a 
popular perception that a number of well-run, 
efficient businesses in the United Kingdom are at a 
disadvantage to companies that are engaged in 
aggressive international tax planning because they 
can’t do that just because they are not international 
companies.  Now, I’m not saying that’s right or not, 
but that’s an important input into the overall debate 
I think. 
MR. KEYTE:  Maureen? 
MS. OHLHAUSEN:  I agree with Andrea 
completely, particularly on the competition advocacy 
point.  Are there regulations in place that are 
restricting competition one way or the other and 
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should they be updated to allow more competition in 
the market while still having some of the protections 
in place that were the reason for having the 
regulation to begin with?  I think that is a very 
valuable role for competition agencies to play because 
we can bring that perspective to the table that the 
industry-specific regulator may or may not have, or in 
the United States state legislatures. 
I think one of the other things that I see 
as what is leveling the playing field — I wouldn’t 
really use that term, but I would say what we want is 
to be sure there’s competition on the merits.  Is this 
behavior competition on the merits, and you can win by 
being the best competitor because you offer consumers 
the best deal, all those different factors of the deal 
that consumers value? 
But where there are cases where there is not 
competition on the merits — so, for example, I want to 
talk about the McWane case that the FTC brought a few 
years ago, where you had a manufacturer that had about 
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90 percent of the market share and it went and locked 
up all the distributors, and the distributors were key 
in this very exciting market of water pipes for big 
construction projects.  There’s a lot of money there 
but it’s not very exciting.  It’s not high-tech, but 
the principles of that case do apply very much to the 
high-tech industry. 
If you’re locking up the distributors and 
there’s no efficiency justification, that’s not 
competition on the merits.  You are not providing the 
best service to consumers and winning that way.  So I 
would say that’s the kind of thing where there wasn’t 
a “level playing field” there, that the player with 
the very strong market power was preventing 
competition on the merits from occurring. 
MR. KEYTE:  Questions? 
QUESTION:  David Sutcliffe, Sports 
Technology.  I just want to raise a couple of points. 
One, when you go back to the financial 
crisis, where Wall Street packaged up a lot of garbage 
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and sold it around the world and took down the global 
financial system, you had a situation where the 
companies were basically deemed “too big to fail,” and 
therefore the people at the Justice Department under 
Eric Holder backed away and did not prosecute any 
individual whatsoever, and that resulted in the book 
that you’ve probably read, called The Chickenshit 
Club.   
MR. KEYTE:  Let’s get to a question. 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Sutcliffe]:  I want to jump 
to the online business where you have terms and 
conditions of agreement, terms of service, where it’s 
in six-point type, it’s three pages long, and 
consumers don’t read it, and even if they did read it 
they wouldn’t understand it.  I’m wondering if that’s 
an area for regulators to step in and say shouldn’t 
the platform operators make the terms clear, visible, 
and readable? 
MR. KEYTE:  Thank you.  Maybe not antitrust. 
MS. OHLHAUSEN:  You stole my punchline 
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there, James.  
That is a core consumer protection issue, 
and that’s the kind of thing the FTC has looked at 
across industries.  Whether they’re big companies or 
small companies, whatever the company is doing, if it 
has some term that consumers may not expect, like 
they’re collecting information that might be 
particularly sensitive for consumers, we have required 
them to be clear about that. 
One of the other things that I have found — 
and it has been really interesting because I have been 
in this game a long time — is seeing how terms and 
conditions — we’ve had that for years.  But one of the 
things that on the flip side of our fast-moving 
online, very connected society is objectionable terms 
and conditions in consumer agreements get surfaced a 
lot more quickly too.  You have a lot of consumer 
groups or advocates or academics who do delve in and 
read those things and say, “Hey, wait a minute, this 
stinks, that’s not good.”  I’ve seen that cycle.  
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There can be a beneficial side too of this, that these 
kinds of problems do get surfaced more quickly.  
The FTC has brought enforcement actions 
where apps were collecting sensitive information about 
consumers without giving them notice that they were 
collecting and that was going to be used or shared in 
a certain way. 
MR. KEYTE:  Eleanor? 
QUESTION [Prof. Eleanor Fox, NYU]:  I want 
to return to your question, James, on leveling the 
playing field because I think that’s very provocative 
and because it’s a very important focus. 
I think you have both brought out that there 
can be anticompetitive leveling of playing field and 
there can be procompetitive leveling of playing field. 
Where I’m going is on the procompetitive 
leveling of playing field do we need a better term 
that “consumer welfare?”  You both mentioned instances 
in which increasing mobility — it could be for workers 
across a long range — of people to contest the market 
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is procompetitive, and yet it doesn’t fit within a 
narrow definition of consumer welfare. 
I noticed that you, Andrea, in your talk did 
not talk about consumer welfare but you talked about 
“creating the environment for robust competition.”  So 
do we need a term that seems more dynamic and more 
robust and not be too afraid of saying, “Yes this 
helps a producer, but it helps the producer in a 
procompetitive way”? 
MR. COSCELLI:  Yes.  I think this reflects a 
bit the overlapping or slightly different discussions 
here and in the United Kingdom. 
The way I think about it I’m comfortable 
with “consumer welfare” for us, and I think quite a 
lot of the heavy lifting can be done by other rules 
and regulations to create the environment for that 
sort of “competition on the merits,” which actually is 
a phrase I’m very comfortable with because in many 
ways it represents what I was trying to say with 
“level the playing field.” 
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MS. OHLHAUSEN: I don’t know about having a 
broader term.  But I do think, Eleanor, the way I like 
to think about this is: first of all, people often 
say, “Antitrust, markets, you’re only concerned with 
price — price, price, price.”  Price is the easiest 
thing to measure.  But competitive markets offer a 
whole lot of other values that consumers care about.  
So I think that would be helpful. 
The other thing is when we’re talking about 
dislocation — and Fred talked about this in a very 
interesting way yesterday — we shouldn’t overlook the 
fact that a lot of these online markets have allowed 
people to compete across geographies that you 
previously couldn’t compete in.   
My husband has a small business.  He works 
out of an office in our house.  Before the Internet it 
was very difficult and now it’s very easy, 
particularly because noise doesn’t carry over emails, 
and when our kids were little and they were screaming 
and he would try to be on the phone with a client, he 
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would have to close the door and throw M&Ms under the 
door to keep the kids quiet.  Now he can just email.  
So I’ve seen it in my own house. 
I’m not saying everything is perfect, but 
sometimes I think we look at the changes that 
technology has wrought in terms of dislocation without 
necessarily also weighing some of the new flexibility 
and new virtual mobility. 
QUESTION:  Hi.  My name is Michael Stein.  
I'm from Manikay Partners. 
A question for Andrea.  As you hinted in 
your speech, after Brexit I think you’re probably 
going to be a bit busier.  Can you talk about how that 
transition is going to go?  Are you ramping up 
staffing?  Maybe talk a little bit about some areas 
where CMA differs or has different priorities than the 
European Commission?  Also, are notifications going to 
be similar to the way it has been working at the EC 
with a very lengthy prenotification period, or is it 
going to be a slightly different process? 
Draft #1 56 
 
 
 
 
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.      714-960-4577 
MR. COSCELLI:  Lots of questions. 
A significant part of my job is Brexit 
preparations.  As people know from reading the papers, 
it’s a very delicate phase as there’s a lot of 
uncertainty.   
There is a scenario where there is an 
agreement that is approved by the UK Parliament, and 
there is an implementation period, so in many ways 
things would not change until essentially January 
2021.  There is a scenario where there is no agreement 
and everything changes essentially at the end of March 
next year.  We are preparing for both scenarios. 
As some people here might know, we have been 
asked by the government also to be the state aid 
authority for the United Kingdom.  That will be very 
much to have a sort of lockstep regulatory system with 
the European Commission.  That’s a significant change 
because obviously it’s taking on a new function. 
We are spending quite a lot of time 
recruiting and expanding.  As I said, the main 
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complexity is really in the next few months to try to 
see of these two main scenarios where we are going to 
head.  Obviously, as we get closer to March 2019, 
companies that want to merge and serve the UK market 
will have to start thinking about notification 
strategies.  We will be obviously talking to Carles 
[Esteva Mosso] as things evolve and we will try to do 
our best to plan and help and support the companies.  
But the uncertainty at the moment is there, so we can 
mitigate things but we don’t have a complete full 
roadmap. 
QUESTION:  Pallavi Guniganti from Global 
Competition Review. 
With regard to the Facebook/Instagram 
merger, there have certainly been suggestions that if 
agencies feel they got that wrong or that there were 
developments in the market since then the way to deal 
with that is to go back and break up the merger that 
happened, to undo the merger.  In the United States we 
generally would only do that very proximately after a 
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merger has been consummated.  So far as I know, there 
isn’t a law prohibiting it from happening later.  I’d 
be curious to think from both enforcers what they 
think of that — not necessarily just about 
Facebook/Instagram, but in general the potential for 
doing that, given rapid developments in markets. 
MR. COSCELLI:  I did use that just as an 
example.  I’m nowhere near suggesting any of the 
things you are talking about. 
I think it is just a reminder to all of us 
that we just need to do retrospective assessments and 
learn from past mergers.  There are certainly some 
parts of the economy where things have changed quite 
quickly, and so these are the parts where I would 
really need to learn a bit more. 
As I said, no one will ever know what the 
counterfactual is to that particular transaction.  So 
that particular transaction clearly has happened and 
nothing is likely to happen to it at this late stage. 
But there is a policy question — and I think 
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Maureen referred to that — which is when there is 
quite a lot of uncertainty in dynamic markets and 
someone has a strong position in the market and there 
are upstart competitors, what is the right policy in 
terms of merger control, which is clearly very much 
case-specific, but also it is important to think a bit 
broadly across categories of cases to make sure we are 
in the right place. 
Obviously, there is a fairly active academic 
debate in this area.  Again, it is quite important for 
the authorities to keep track of it and to see whether 
any brilliant ideas come from that particular debate. 
MS. OHLHAUSEN:  Two answers to your 
question, Pallavi. 
The first one is obviously, as I think you 
mentioned, we have challenged consummated mergers.  We 
have one, Otto Bock, in litigation right now, but that 
was very soon after.  One of the challenges, and why 
we have the whole Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger 
notification, is how do you unscramble the eggs?   To 
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go into court ten years later and say, “Oh, on second 
thought … .” 
My experience with courts is they’re very 
pragmatic.  You’re asking them for some remedy.  They 
don’t want to be regulatory.  They don’t want to take 
over a business and have to make those kinds of 
decisions.  So I think on a practical level that’s 
very difficult. 
But then secondly, to build on what Andrea 
said, and why I thought the CDK/Auto/Mate decision was 
so interesting, often we hear these concerns:  “Okay, 
you’ve got a big player and they want to move into a 
new functionality, and there’s ten different current 
players who are doing that.  If they pick one, why is 
that problematic, because otherwise they could just do 
it organically; these things they can figure out?” 
So why would we want to say, “Well, we’re 
going to try to stop that, but we can’t stop the 
organic growth.”  You would need to say why was that 
one particularly well-positioned that that was going 
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to be the one that was going to actually come up and 
be the giant killer down the road such that it is 
actually squelching competition. 
The interesting thing about CDK/Auto/Mate 
was the facts and the economics and everything really 
came together to show that when you have that 
situation the antitrust law — I mean they ended up 
abandoning so we didn’t have to litigate, but I felt 
very confident about that case, that we had the kinds 
of evidence you needed to show that that would be a 
problem. 
But, Andrea, I think you mentioned it’s hard 
to go back ten years later and say, “Was this player 
that was purchased so successful for competitive or 
anticompetitive — was it because they got the infusion 
of capital and they were the one who made the best new 
version of that product because of the support of the 
big company?  That’s not necessarily anticompetitive. 
QUESTION:  Robert Vidal, Taylor Wessing. 
There’s an issue that came up yesterday and 
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I’d be interested in your views.  It’s to do with 
“winner take all” markets and network effects.  This 
is in the context of a recent decision in the United 
Kingdom, Just Eat/Hungryhouse, where the CMA appeared 
to accept that Just Eat had effectively won that 
market and it could therefore take over its only 
competitor because it accepted that the competitor 
would inevitably exit that market in the future at 
some point because of these network effects. 
It just seems to me that we don’t really 
appear to have a grip on this kind of network effect 
issue.  Is there a solution to this?  There are 
certainly these dynamic markets where once you’ve got 
that network effect, that first-mover advantage, 
you’re unassailable.  So what do you do in that 
situation? 
MR. COSCELLI:  I’m not sure it’s a perfectly 
correct characterization.  The reason we cleared that 
case was because of entry and expansion by other 
platforms.  I think it would be an odd decision by a 
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competition authority to essentially just accept a 
monopoly absent specific reasons.  There might be some 
cases where you are very confident that the threat of 
entry is sufficient to discipline the monopolist, but 
it is not that common. 
I think the issue with the network effects 
is a valid one, which is that sometimes there are 
efficiencies from being very big.  We were talking 
[yesterday] about taxis, and obviously in the very 
short term you would like to have a very dense service 
for taxis because there are lots of drivers and lots 
of passengers. 
The question you have to ask yourself as a 
competition authority is “What next?”  Maybe you like 
it in the short term, but maybe in the medium to long 
term the industry is not going to evolve in the best 
possible way. 
So I think it’s a valid issue and I think 
it’s one of the reasons why competition authorities 
have accepted a significant reduction in the number of 
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players in a number of industries.  But going down all 
the way to a monopoly I still think is pretty much an 
exceptional situation to accept that.   
I think in a number of cases where you have 
a dominant platform buying a weaker competitor we 
usually like the competition anyway because in a sense 
it’s the only competition left.  
I’m not sure that showing up in front of us 
or another competition authority saying, “By the way, 
I’m competing with an incumbent who has a 70 percent 
market share, I have 30 percent, I don’t like my 
position, so my best exit now is to sell to the owner 
of the 70 percent market share,” I’m not so sure we 
would particularly like that story.   
But it’s always case by case in mergers.  
You do deep dives.  In the context of the way that 
competition works, the network effect is clearly one 
of the factors that you look at in the assessment. 
MS. OHLHAUSEN:  I agree with everything 
Andrea said there. 
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But I also want to mention a challenge we 
brought to a merger last year in DraftKings/FanDuel.  
There was an interesting argument that the parties put 
forth, which was: “Well, eventually there’s only going 
to be one of us who wins this battle.  It’s an online 
platform and eventually only one of us is going to be 
the winner.  So let us fast-forward to that and one of 
us will buy the other one because that’s the 
inevitable outcome.”  We challenged the deal and they 
eventually abandoned it. 
The really interesting part about it is it’s 
so hard to predict where things are going.  So you 
talk about the first-mover advantage or something.  A 
lot of the big companies that you talk about weren’t 
the first mover in those spaces.  There were social 
media platforms before Facebook.  There were search 
engines before Google or Bing.  But it’s very hard to 
predict where things will go. 
To bring you back to DraftKings/FanDuel, one 
of the issues was its legality was challenged in a lot 
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of the U.S. states — was this online gambling?  Then 
the Supreme Court came out with a decision that was 
more favorable, and so there has been this huge 
explosion.  So I thought Wow!  The idea that we know 
the future and we know that only one of them is going 
to win — we really need to approach that with caution 
because, as Yogi Berra said, it’s difficult to make 
predictions especially about the future.  
MR. KEYTE:  I’m going to ask the last two 
questions. 
Andrea, I understand the network effects and 
the merger issue.  How about network effects and what 
we call over here essential facility?  Somebody 
organically gets a monopoly-like position with a 
network effect.  They’re not engaging in traditional 
exclusionary behavior, and new nascent rivals think 
they need access to some resource because they can’t 
get to a tipping point.  Do you have a doctrine in the 
United Kingdom like essential facilities and does it 
apply in a network effects situation where the larger 
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company is not necessarily doing anything wrong? 
MR. COSCELLI:  We do.  I think the bar for 
intervention, quite rightly, is quite high in this.  
Obviously, the history of why you end up there 
matters.  If you look at a lot of the European cases 
historically where there was access given to 
facilities, most of these cases were about state-owned 
enterprises and facilities.  I think historically both 
the agencies and the courts in Europe have been very 
careful not to interfere with companies that acquired 
those positions through innovation. 
This is not to say that at some point after 
a number of years, if you really worry that the 
outcomes are poor and you think the shareholders of 
the company have had quite a lot of joy for a number 
of years, maybe you think on balance that some form of 
intervention is appropriate.   
But it’s a complex tradeoff and I think we 
all fully internalize the concerns in terms of the 
signals that you are sending for investment and 
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innovation.  So I think if you look around the 
landscape there have been very few cases of this sort 
in Europe. 
The United Kingdom I would say is probably a 
halfway house between other European countries and the 
United States.  I think our courts tend to take a 
fairly negative view of intervention on the back of 
successful innovation unless there are very good 
reasons to intervene. 
MR. KEYTE:  Maureen, since it’s coming to a 
close, I wanted to ask personally in your long tenure 
what accomplishment are you most proud of at the FTC? 
MS. OHLHAUSEN:  That’s a hard one. 
One thing that I would say I’m most proud of 
is that I really think — it’s twofold.  One is being 
able to run the agency and keep up the mission of 
protecting consumers so effectively during a really 
unprecedented time for the agency.  So I felt very 
positive about that and really good about it, and 
that’s why I highlighted it in my speech. 
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The second thing that I really feel proud of 
is the work on breaking down barriers for just the 
average person who wants to start a business and enter 
the market.  Economic Liberty means a lot to me 
because I think about individuals — the hair braider, 
the food truck owner, the little guy.   
We talked about populism yesterday.  I think 
a lot of things that are driving this is this feeling 
that the system is too onerous and tool rigged against 
the little guy and you can’t even get in and some of 
that is from government regulation.  Even well-meaning 
government regulation is making it too hard for people 
to pursue their dreams in the marketplace when they’re 
on the lowest end of the economic ladder. 
Fighting that battle and turning a spotlight 
on it I think is one of the things that I feel proud 
about. 
MR. KEYTE:  Thank you very much.   
Please join me in thanking our speakers. 
Let’s take ten minutes or so for a break and 
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hop into the mergers panel. 
[Break: 10:37 a.m.] 
